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Nationalist	  Jāhiliyyah	  and	  the	  Flag	  of	  the	  Two	  Crusaders,	  or:	  
ISIS,	  Soveriegnty	  and	  the	  ‘Owl	  of	  Minerva’ 	  
This	  article	  argues	  that	  by	  understanding	  ISIS	  state-­‐building	  processes	  we	  are	  able	  to	  understand	  how	  
ISIS	  has	  developed	  while	  also	  developing	  a	  united	  citizenship	  body	  built	  from	  people	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  
and	  those	  making	  hijra.	  The	  fragmentation	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  resulted	  in	  conditions	  that	  would	  prove	  
conducive	  to	   the	  group’s	  expansion	  and	   identifying	   these	  conditions	   is	   imperative	   to	  understanding	  
Sunni	  extremism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  article	  argues	  that	  ISIS	  builds	  citizenship	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  by	  
developing	  asabiyya	   –	   group	   feeling	   –	   amongst	   Sunni	   and	   second,	   by	   securitizing	   the	   Shi’a	   threat.	  
Identifying	   and	   engaging	   with	   the	   concepts	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   citizenship	   helps	   to	   develop	   much	  
stronger	  policy	  responses.	  
“The	  owl	  of	  Minerva	  spreads	  its	  wings	  only	  within	  the	  falling	  of	  the	  dusk.”1	  
Introduction	  
On	   24th	   September	   2014,	   at	   the	   69th	   session	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   General	  
Assembly,	  US	   President	   Barak	  Obama	  declared	   ISIS	   a	   terrorist	   organization,	   yet	   to	  
define	   the	   group	   solely	   in	   these	   terms	   is	  misleading.	   Since	   its	   emergence	   in	   early	  
June	  2014,	  debates	  have	  raged	  over	  how	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  group.	  Initially	  referred	  to	  as	  
the	  Islamic	  State	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Al	  Sham,	  this	  quickly	  turned	  to	  the	  Islamic	  State	  of	  Iraq	  
and	   the	   Levant,	   ISIS,	   Islamic	   State,	   ‘so-­‐called’	   Islamic	   State,	   several	   variations	  on	   a	  
theme	   and	   now	  Da’ish.	   Despite	  many	   referring	   to	   the	   group	   as	  Da’ish,	   this	   article	  
uses	   ISIS,	   predominantly	   to	   ensure	   coherence	   with	   the	   name	   used	   in	   their	  
publications.	  Ultimately,	   such	   debates	   are	   important	   in	   seeking	   to	   understand	   the	  
group,	   along	  with	   designing	   successful	   ‘counter-­‐narrative’	   campaigns	   to	   ultimately	  
defeat	  the	  group.	  To	  create	  a	  policy	  that	  can	  defeat	  ISIS,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  engage	  with	  
questions	  about	  how	  to	  conceptualise	  it	  –	  along	  with	  how	  the	  group	  positions	  itself	  –	  
to	  formulate	  a	  suitable	  response.	  	  	  
In	   the	  years	   following	   the	  emergence	  of	   ISIS,	   the	  group	  has	   flagrantly	   rejected	   the	  
norms	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  which	  have	  been	  the	  bedrock	  of	  international	  
politics	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   and	   violently	   resisted	   political	  
organisation	  across	  the	  Middle	  East.	  With	  the	  following	  words,	  the	  Middle	  East	  was	  
redrawn	  and	  a	  caliphate	  was	  declared	  
Without	   the	   condition	   of	   the	   caliphate	   being	   realized,	  all	   power	   is	   simply	   worldly	  
kingship,	   domination	   and	   governance,	   accompanied	   by	   destruction,	   corruption,	  
injustice,	  coercion	  and	  fear,	  and	  the	  degradation	  and	  decline	  of	  humans	  to	  the	  level	  
of	  animals.	  This	  is	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  succession	  to	  God,	  for	  which	  God	  has	  created	  us.2	  
Since	   then,	   the	   group’s	   actions	   across	   the	   world	   have	   captured	   global	   headlines,	  
which	  has	   largely	   taken	   focus	  away	   from	  their	  attempts	   to	  organise	  political	   life	   in	  
Iraq	  and	  Syria.	  One	   such	  way	   to	  address	   this	  problem	   is	   to	   consider	   ISIS	  efforts	   at	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harnessing	  the	  popular	  support	  that	  the	  group	  is	  able	  to	  draw	  upon	  –	  no	  matter	  how	  
unpopular	  such	  an	  admission	  is	  –	  and	  explore	  the	  state-­‐building	  project.3	  	  
Debate	  as	  to	  how	  best	  to	  tackle	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  ISIS	  –	  at	  home	  and	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East	  –	  has	  dominated	  policy	  discussions	  in	  Western	  states.	  As	  Major	  General	  Michael	  
Nagata	  of	   the	  US	  army	  acknowledged,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  defeat	   the	  group	  without	  
understanding	  it.	  While	  the	  canon	  of	  literature	  exploring	  the	  ISIS	  is	  ever	  growing,	  this	  
predominantly	  focuses	  upon	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  group	  while	  telling	  the	  story	  of	  how	  
it	   emerged.	   Very	   little	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   the	   context	   within	   which	   ISIS	  
operates,	   which	   supports	   Nagata’s	   claim	   that,	   “we	   do	   not	   understand	   the	  
movement,	   and	   until	   we	   do,	   we	   are	   not	   going	   to	   defeat	   it”.4	  Engaging	   with	   the	  
conditions	   that	   ISIS	   operates	   and	   exists	   within	   is	   of	   paramount	   importance	   to	  
understanding	   how	   it	   has	   been	   able	   to	   declare	   a	   caliphate,	   and	   to	   encourage	  
thousands	  of	  people	  to	  travel	  to	  join	  the	  state.	  
This	   article	   argues	   that	   the	   group	   has	   not	   been	   adequately	   located	   within	   the	  
broader	   dynamics	   of	   the	  Middle	   East,	   notably	  with	   regard	   to	   sub	   and	   supra	   state	  
affairs	   across	   Iraq	   and	   Syria.	   This	   lack	   of	   grounding	   within	   regional	   dynamics	   has	  
been	   combined	   with	   a	   lack	   of	   conceptualisation	   as	   to	   to	   how	   to	   understand	   the	  
group,	   which	   appears	   to	   fuse	   terrorist	   tactics	   with	   broader	   insurgency	   methods,	  
while	   establishing	   political	   organisation	   across	   a	   territory	   the	   size	   of	   the	   United	  
Kingdom.	  This	  article	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  locate	  ISIS	  within	  the	  political	  and	  
security	  dynamics	  across	  the	  region,	  which	  can	  help	  explain	  its	  emergence	  and	  how	  
it	   gained	   support	   from	   local	   populations	   on	   the	   ground.	   It	   then	   suggests	   that	   by	  
utilising	   the	   concept	   of	   sovereignty	   we	   are	   better	   equipped	   to	   understand	   and	  
engage	   with	   political	   organisation	   within	   ISIS	   territory	   and	   and	   ultimately,	   gain	   a	  
greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  group.	  	  
In	   doing	   this,	   the	   article	   makes	   two	   substantial	   claims:	   first,	   it	   offers	   a	   stronger	  
conceptual	   understanding	  of	   the	   rise	  of	   ISIS	   and	  how	   it	   has	  been	  able	   to	   cultivate	  
support	   from	   across	   the	   region	   through	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   previous	   system;	  
second,	  it	  suggests	  that	  to	  populate	  the	  caliphate,	  the	  group	  has	  sought	  to	  develop	  a	  
sense	  of	  asabiyya	  –	  or	  group	  feeling	  –	  amongst	  Sunni	  Muslims	  while	  also	  securitizing	  
the	  Shi’a	  threat.	  It	  does	  this	  by	  drawing	  upon	  material	  contained	  within	  Dabiq,	  ISIS’s	  
English	   language	   magazine,	   to	   identify	   processes	   of	   securitization	   and	   the	  
construction	   of	   asabiyya	   or	   “kinship”.	   It	   is	   worth	   stressing	   that	   ISIS	   publishes	  
propaganda	  material	   in	  a	  number	  of	  different	   languages,	   including	  Arabic,	  Turkish,	  
French	  and	  Russian,	  however,	  this	  article	  focuses	  only	  on	  English	  literature	  with	  the	  
prominence	  of	  UK	  and	  US	  citizens	  travelling	  to	   join	  the	  group.	   In	   late	  2015,	   figures	  
from	  The	  Soufan	  Group	  suggested	  that	  760	  people	  had	  travelled	  from	  the	  UK	  to	  join	  
ISIS	  and	  a	   further	  250	  had	   travelled	   from	  the	  US.5	  While	  a	  number	  of	  people	  have	  
focussed	  on	   the	   ISIS	   literature	  offering	  a	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  Dabiq,	   this	  article	  
uses	   the	   literature	   as	   a	   means	   to	   understand	   the	   state	   building	   project	   and	  
ultimately,	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  group	  and	  its	  appeal.	  	  
Of	   course,	   to	   rely	   upon	   Dabiq	   as	   a	   means	   of	   engaging	   with	   conditions	   in	   the	  
caliphate	   is	   problematic,	   as	   the	   magazine	   undeniably	   acts	   as	   a	   propaganda	   tool	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rather	   than	   accurately	   depicting	   events	   on	   the	   ground.	   Subjectivity	   and	   reliability	  
problems	  aside,	  it	  does,	  however,	  provide	  useful	  scope	  with	  regard	  to	  understanding	  
the	  narratives	  used	  to	  incite	  people	  to	  make	  hijra.	   It	  also	  provides	  opportunities	  to	  
understand	   the	   ideological	   vision	   and	   locate	   state-­‐building	   efforts	   within	   group’s	  
aims	  and	  objectives.	  	  
Rejecting	  Jāhiliyyah	  &	  The	  Emergence	  of	  ISIS	  
In	  understanding	  the	  roots	  of	  ISIS,	  one	  must	  trace	  the	  link	  between	  ISIS	  and	  Al	  Qa’ida	  
in	   Iraq,	   (AQI)	   the	   Al	   Qa’ida	   franchise	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   Jordanian	   Abu	  
Musab	   Al	   Zarqawi.	   AQI,	   a	   forerunner	   of	   ISIS,6	  shared	   a	   number	   of	   members	   who	  
were	  united	  at	  the	  American	  prison,	  Camp	  Bucca7	  by	  the	  group’s	  leader,	  Abu	  Bakr	  Al	  
Baghdadi.	   Al	   Baghdadi	   was	   born	   in	   Iraq	   and	   by	   2003,	   was	   a	   cleric	   in	   the	   city	   of	  
Samarra,	   which	   had	   long	   been	   characterised	   by	   sectarian	   differences,	   along	   with	  
much	  of	  southern	  Iraq.8	  On	  30th	  June	  2014	  Al	  Baghdadi	  would	  declare	  himself	  Caliph	  
Ibrahim,	  the	  theological	  leader	  of	  the	  caliphate	  and	  the	  figurehead	  of	  the	  state	  and	  
in	   doing	   so,	   would	   begin	   the	   process	   of	   building	   a	   state.	   The	   ISIS	   narrative	   was	  
explicit	   in	   its	   desire	   to	  provide	  an	  alternative	   form	  of	  political	   organisation	  and	   its	  
behaviour	  on	  the	  international	  stage	  would	  support	  this	  quest.	  
In	  one	  of	  the	  first	  ISIS	  videos	  to	  gain	  traction	  in	  the	  Western	  press,	  Bastian	  Vasquez,	  
a	  Norwegian-­‐Chilean	  man	  stood	  on	  the	  border	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  and	  stated:	  
Bismillah	   ir-­‐Rahman	   ir-­‐Rahim.	  As	   you	  can	   see	   right	  now,	   I’m	  on	   the	  border	  of	   Iraq	  
and	  al	  Sham.	  Right	  now	   I’m	   inside	  of	  As	  sham.	  As	  you	  can	  see	   this	   is	   the	  so-­‐called	  
border	   of	   Sykes-­‐Picot.	   Alhamdulillah,	   we	   don’t	   recognise	   it	   and	   we	   will	   never	  
recognise	  it.	  Inshallah	  this	  is	  not	  the	  first	  border	  that	  we	  will	  break	  and	  Inshallah,	  we	  
shall	  break	  all	  the	  borders,	  but	  we	  shall	  start	  with	  this,	   Inshallah.	  […]	  Alhamdullilah	  
there	   is	  nobody	  now	  except	  the	  soldiers	  of	  dar	  al	   Islam.	  So	  alhamdulillah	   Inshallah	  
we	  cross	  the	  border.	  Bismillah.	  […]	  As	  you	  can	  see,	  this	  is	  under	  our	  feet	  right	  now.	  
[…]	  As	  Abu	  Bakr	  Al	  Baghdadi	  used	  to	  say	  ‘He	  is	  the	  breaker	  of	  barriers’.	  Inshallah	  we	  
will	  break	  the	  barrier	  of	  Iraq,	  Jordan,	  Lebanon,	  all	  the	  county[sic]	  Inshallah.	  Until	  we	  
reach	  Quds.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  of	  many	  barriers	  we	  shall	  break	  Inshallah.9	  	  
The	   video	   stressed	   the	   group’s	   desire	   to	   overthrow	   the	   legacy	   of	   the	   Sykes-­‐Picot	  
agreement10	  and	   the	  yoke	  of	   colonialism,	  often	  held	   to	  be	   responsible	   for	  most	  of	  
the	  region’s	  ills.11	  It	  also	  reflected	  the	  power	  of	  the	  group’s	  narrative,	  encouraging	  a	  
Norwegian-­‐Chilean	  –	  along	  with	  individuals	  from	  over	  100	  different	  states	  -­‐	  to	  make	  
hijra	  (migrate)	  to	  join	  ISIS.	  	  
Following	  Vasquez’s	  video	  and	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  caliphate,	  ISIS	  would	  expand	  its	  
propaganda	  campaign,	  predominantly	  through	  publishing	  literature	  in	  the	  magazine	  
Dabiq	  by	  the	  Al	  Hayat	  media	  centre,	  named	  after	  the	  Syrian	  city	  at	  which	  the	  fight	  
between	  dar	  al	  Islam	  and	  the	  armies	  of	  Rome	  would	  bring	  about	  the	  end	  of	  days.12	  
The	  first	  issue	  of	  the	  magazine	  called	  on	  all	  Sunni	  Muslims	  to	  “Raise	  your	  head	  high	  
for	   today,	   by	   Allah’s	   grace	   you	   have	   a	   state	   and	   Khalifan,	   which	   will	   return	   you	  
dignity,	  might,	   rights	   and	   leadership”.13	  By	   issue	   15	   of	  Dabiq,	   three	   phases	   of	   the	  
magazine	   can	   be	   identified.	   The	   early	   issues	   contained	   a	   call	   to	  hijra	   and	   focused	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upon	   the	   West	   and	   attacks,	   middle	   issues	   would	   focus	   more	   upon	   life	   in	   the	  
caliphate	  and	  the	  state-­‐building	  efforts,	  while	  later	  issues	  would	  place	  the	  emphasis	  
firmly	  upon	  the	  global	  jihadist	  emergency	  and	  attacks	  on	  the	  West.14	  
With	   this	   declaration,	  Dabiq	  began	   the	   process	   of	   populating	   the	   state,	   calling	   on	  
Muslims	   to	   travel	   to	   join	   the	   group:	   “Rush	   of	  Muslim	   to	   your	   state.	   Yes	   it	   is	   your	  
State!	   Rush,	   because	   Syria	   is	   not	   for	   Syrians	   and	   Iraq	   is	   not	   for	   the	   Iraqis	   (...)	   The	  
State	  is	  a	  state	  for	  all	  Muslims”.15	  Across	  Dabiq,	  authors	  are	  keen	  to	  stress	  the	  trans-­‐
national	   nature	   of	   ISIS’s	   citizenry,	   united	   by	   a	   shared	   Sunni,	   Muslim	   identity	   and	  
membership	  of	  the	  umma.	  In	  many	  cases,	  this	  Sunni	  aspect	  is	  implicit,	  given	  that	  for	  
ISIS,	   the	   Shi’a	   are	   considered	   to	  be	  Rawafid	   (plural)	   and	  Rafidi	   (singular),	  meaning	  
rejectionist,	   although	  when	   describing	   the	   Iraqi	   army,	   the	   term	   safavid	   is	   used,	   in	  
reference	  to	  the	  growing	  Iranian	  influence	  on	  Iraqi	  politics.	  	  
Such	   language	   is	  key	   in	  appealing	   to	  Sunni	  Muslims	  both	   in	  Syria	  and	   Iraq	  but	  also	  
across	  the	  world,	  by	  playing	  on	  fears	  of	  external	  manipulation	  –	  evoking	  memories	  of	  
the	   Sykes-­‐Picot	   agreement	   –	   and	   long-­‐standing	   concerns	   of	   Iranian	   (or	   Persian)	  
expansionist	  agendas.	  In	  The	  ISIS	  Papers,	  obtained	  by	  The	  Guardian,	  this	  sentiment	  is	  
documented	  “The	  traitorous	  governments	  have	  tried	  to	  mislead	  the	  Sunni	  peoples	  in	  
every	  Arab	  land,	  as	  corrupt	  programmes	  were	  introduced	  for	  them	  and	  there	  spread	  
among	   them	   the	   love	   of	   vice,	   bonds,	   bribery,	   usury	   and	   abandoning	  worship	   and	  
forgetting	  the	  rulings	  of	  jihad”.16	  	  	  	  
The	   magazine	   later	   stressed	   that	   “ISIS	   no	   longer	   exists	   in	   small	   cells	   that	   can	   be	  
neutralized	   by	   missiles	   or	   small	   groups	   of	   commandos.	   It	   is	   now	   a	   real	   and	  
unrecognized	   state	   actor”.17	  By	   their	   own	   admission,	   the	   group	   considers	   itself	   a	  
state,	  albeit,	  couched	  in	  theological	  terms.	  Of	  course,	  by	  acknowledging	  their	  lack	  of	  
recognition	   from	   the	   international	   community	   –	   through	   which	   states	   gain	  
sovereignty	  –	  ISIS	  is	  framing	  itself	  as	  exceptional	  and	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  political	  
system	  of	  the	  day.	  	  
Facilitating	  Conditions	  
To	  understand	  the	  emergence	  of	  ISIS	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  conditions	  from	  
which	   they	  emerged	  and	  how	  they	  were	  able	   to	  draw	  support	   from	  people	  across	  
Iraq	  and	  Syria.	  The	  legacy	  of	  colonialism	  and	  the	  ensuing	  establishment	  of	  a	  system	  
of	   political	   organisation	   driven	   by	   nationalist	   sentiment	   but	   underpinned	   by	  
sectarian	  identities	  would	  create	  states	  that	  were	  inherently	  exclusionary.	  In	  recent	  
years,	   the	   marginalisation	   of	   Sunni	   Muslims	   within	   both	   states,	   economically	   and	  
politically,	   coupled	  with	   an	   increase	   in	   Shi’a-­‐led	   violence	  would	   lead	   to	   conditions	  
where	   individuals	  were	   forced	   to	   turn	   to	   the	   group	   to	   ensure	   their	   survival.18	  This	  
resulted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  people	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  community	  under	  ISIS	  control	  
yet	   not	   necessarily	   agreeing	   with	   their	   ideological	   vision,	   or	   indeed,	   their	   violent	  
tactics.	  	  
The	   fragmentation	   of	   Iraq	   in	   2003	   would	   prove	   integral	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   ISIS,	  
turning	   long-­‐standing	   power	   relations	   and	   grievances	  within	   them	  on	   their	   heads,	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leading	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   Shi’a	   government	   in	   Baghdad.19	  The	   de-­‐ba’athification	  
process	   implemented	  by	  Coalition	   Provisional	  Authority	  Order	  Number	   220	  in	   2003	  
would	   eviscerate	   the	   infrastructure	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   prevent	   a	  
resurgence	  of	  Ba’athism	  around	  a	  new	  leader.	  It	  would	  also	  result	  in	  around	  300,000	  
people	  made	  unemployed21	  who	  struggled	  to	  find	  work	  and	  to	  protect	  their	  families.	  
As	   a	   result,	   Sunnis	   would	   be	   caught	   in	   between	   coalition	   forces,	   the	   Shi’a	  
government	   in	  Baghdad,	  Shi’a	  militias	   such	  as	  Badr	  Brigades,	   JAM	  and	  Al	  Qa’ida	   in	  
Iraq.	  Facing	  increased	  violence	  from	  these	  actors	  and	  the	  state’s	  reticence	  to	  protect	  
them,	  Sunni	   tribes	  were	   forced	   to	   turn	  elsewhere	   to	  ensure	   that	   their	  basic	  needs	  
were	  met.	  	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  government	  in	  Baghdad	  would	  marginalize	  Sunni	  tribal	  leaders	  and,	  
despite	  an	  earlier	  agreement,	  fail	  to	  bring	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Awakening	  movement	  
into	   state	   infrastructure, 22 	  fuelling	   grievances.	   This	   mistake,	   coupled	   with	   the	  
increasing	  violence	  against	   religious	  communities	  would	  deepen	  sectarian	  divisions	  
across	   the	   state,	   along	   with	   the	   perception	   that	   events	   were	   manipulated	   by	  
external	   forces,	  notably	   Iran.23	  Across	  Anbar	  Province,	   the	   security	   situation	  would	  
deteriorate	   but	   the	   Al	   Maliki	   government	   would	   be	   either	   unwilling	   or	   unable	   to	  
improve	  it,	  once	  more	  adding	  to	  the	  grievances	  amongst	  Sunni	  tribes.	  	  
During	   the	   rule	  of	  Nouri	  al-­‐Maliki	  politics	   took	  on	  an	   increasingly	   sectarian	  nature,	  
creating	   grievances	   that	   would	   add	   to	   the	   distrust	   towards	   the	   government	   in	  
Baghdad.	  As	  an	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  report	  documents	  
Prime	   Minister	   Nouri	   al-­‐Maliki	   has	   implemented	   a	   divide-­‐and-­‐conquer	   strategy	   that	   has	  
neutered	   any	   credible	   Sunni	   Arab	   leadership.	   The	   authorities	   also	   have	   taken	   steps	   that	  
reinforce	   perceptions	   of	   a	   sectarian	   agenda.	   Prominent	   officials	   –	   predominantly	   Sunni	   –	  
have	  been	  cast	  aside	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Justice	  and	  Accountability	  Law	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  alleged	  
senior-­‐level	   affiliation	   to	   the	   former	   Baath	   party.	   Federal	   security	   forces	   have	  
disproportionately	  deployed	  in	  Baghdad’s	  Sunni	  neighbourhoods	  as	  well	  as	  Sunni-­‐populated	  
governorates	   (Anbar,	   Salah	   al-­‐Din,	   Ninew,	   Kirkuk	   and	   Diyala).	   Al-­‐Iraqiya,	   the	   political	  
movement	   to	   which	   Sunni	   Arabs	   most	   readily	   related,	   slowly	   came	   apart	   due	   to	   internal	  
rivalries	   even	   as	   Maliki	   resorted	   to	   both	   legal	   and	   extra-­‐judicial	   means	   to	   consolidate	  
power.24	  
The	  following	  years	  would	  continue	  to	  reproduce	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  structural	  
factors	  that	  would	  see	  the	  replication	  and	  deepening	  of	  Sunni	  grievances	  across	  the	  
state.	  Ultimately,	  this	  would	  create	  the	  conditions	  that	  would	  help	  ISIS	  to	  thrive	  and	  
draw	  support	  from	  local	  populations.	  	  
In	   contrast	   to	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   Iraq,	   many	   were	   surprised	   to	   see	   large	   scale	  
protests	  breaking	  out	  in	  Syria	  and	  few	  expected	  them	  to	  be	  so	  prolonged,	  leading	  to	  
the	  emergence	  of	  a	  seemingly	  intractable	  civil	  war.	  The	  young	  ruler,	  Bashar	  Al	  Assad,	  
was	  seen	  by	  many	  to	  be	  reform	  minded,25	  yet	  his	   response	  to	   the	  protestors,	  with	  
unrelenting	  force	  and	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  conflict	  along	  sectarian	  lines,	  would	  deepen	  
divisions	   between	   regime	   and	   society.	   The	   descent	   into	   civil	   war	   following	   the	  
violent	  repression	  of	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  protests	  in	  early	  2011	  provided	  a	  number	  of	  
violent	  Islamist	  groups	  with	  the	  space	  to	  operate.	  The	  brutality	  of	  the	  Assad	  regime’s	  
response,	   resulting	   in	   a	   conflict	   that	   has	   seen	   over	   400,000	   dead	   and	   11	   million	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people	  displaced,	  4	  million	  externally	  and	  7	  million	   internally,	   forced	  many	   to	   take	  
up	  arms	  to	  protect	  themselves	  and	  their	   families,	  or	  to	  turn	  to	  violent	  groups	  who	  
would	  provide	  protection26.	  It	  is	  from	  these	  conditions	  that	  ISIS	  and	  Jabhat	  al-­‐Nusra	  
–	  amongst	  others	  –	  were	  able	  to	  thrive	  and	  draw	  support	   from	   local	  communities.	  
The	  Assad	  regime	  was	  quick	  to	  frame	  the	  uprisings	  along	  sectarian	  lines	  and,	  in	  doing	  
so,	   drew	   support	   from	   the	   Shi’a	   across	   Syria	   while	   depicting	   the	   opposition	   as	  
extremists.27	  	  
The	  geopolitical	  importance	  of	  Syria	  has	  meant	  that	  a	  range	  of	  external	  actors	  have	  
become	  involved	  in	  the	  conflict,	  both	  directly	  and	  via	  proxies.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  support	  
their	   Shi’a	   ally	  Bashar	   al	  Assad,	  Hizballah,	   the	   Lebanese	  Party	  of	  God,	  has	  become	  
increasingly	  active	  in	  Syria,	  altering	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  conflict.	  The	  struggle	  
against	   the	   Assad	   regime,	   Hizballah	   and	   other	   militias	   operating	   across	   Syria	   has	  
posed	   an	   existential	   challenge	   to	   Sunni	   communities	   across	   the	   state	   and	   similar	  
problems	   occurred	   in	   Iraq	   following	   the	   US	   withdrawal	   from	   the	   state.	   The	  
involvement	   of	   actors	   with	   an	   explicitly	   sectarian	   dimension	   has	   fed	   into	   the	  
divisions	   that	   have	   divided	   communities	   within	   and	   across	   states.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	  
there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   similarities	   between	   the	   conditions	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Syria,	   with	  
increasingly	  marginalised	  communities	   in	  both	  states	  having	  to	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  
state	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  basic	  needs	  were	  met.	  ISIS	  has	  been	  able	  to	  capitalise	  on	  
political	  fragmentation	  across	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  drawing	  support	  from	  individuals	  who	  
faced	  existential	   threats	   on	   a	   regular	   basis	   by	  providing	   them	  with	  protection	   and	  
support	  both	  against	  the	  state	  and	  against	  the	  militias.28	  	  
The	  seizure	  of	  Ramadi	  and	  Mosul	  would	  focus	  attention	  on	  the	  group	  and,	  as	  conflict	  
across	   the	   region	   intensified,	   it	   became	   increasingly	   internationalised	   through	  
(social)	  media	  outlets	  documenting	   the	  brutality	   that	  was	  predominantly	  occurring	  
along	   sectarian	   lines.	   Following	   the	   rising	   prominence	   of	   ISIS,	   a	   number	   of	   groups	  
across	  the	  region	  declared	  allegiance	  to	  Al	  Baghdadi,	  establishing	  vilayats	  (provinces)	  
across	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Africa,	  further	  internationalising	  the	  conflict.	  At	  the	  time	  
of	  writing,	   groups	   in	   Egypt,	   Tunisia,	   Somalia,	   across	   the	   Persian	  Gulf,	   Afghanistan,	  
Pakistan,	  Yemen,	  Algeria	  and	  Nigeria	  have	  declared	  allegiance.29	  	  
Underpinning	   regional	   politics	   and	   the	   penetration	   of	   both	   Iraq	   and	   Syria	   –	   along	  
with	  a	  number	  of	  others	  –	  is	  the	  rivalry	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran,	  which	  while	  
often	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  sectarian	  difference	  is	  ultimately	  about	  geopolitical	  control	  
over	  the	  region.30	  To	  this	  end,	  since	  1979	  and	  the	  revolution	  in	  Iran,	  the	  two	  states	  
have	   become	   embroiled	   in	   an	   increasingly	   fractious	   rivalry,	   providing	   support	   to	  
sectarian	  kin	  across	  the	  region.	  Given	  the	  range	  of	  pressures	  exerted	  on	  the	  people	  
of	   Iraq	  and	  Syria,	   ISIS	  was	  able	   to	   capitalise	  on	  disenfranchisement,	   grievance	  and	  
existential	   concerns	   to	   quickly	   bolster	   their	   ranks.	   Questions	   about	   the	   extent	   to	  
which	  this	  constitutes	  support	  will	  be	  addressed	  at	  a	  later	  point.	  The	  fragmentation	  
of	  political	   geography	  across	   the	   region	  would	  provide	   increased	  opportunities	   for	  
Riyadh	   and	   Tehran	   to	   support	   proxy	   actors	   across	   the	   Middle	   East,	   often	   along	  
sectarian	   lines,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  weaken	   the	   other,	  with	   the	   people	   of	   the	   region	  
paying	  the	  heaviest	  price.31	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Amidst	   this	   fragmentation,	   ISIS	   has	   sought	   to	   establish	   a	   new	   form	   of	   political	  
organisation,	   drawing	   support	   from	   marginalised	   and	   discriminated	   populations	  
across	   the	   region.	   Within	   both	   states,	   latent	   structural	   factors	   have	   increasingly	  
manifested	  in	  violence	  as	  political	  organisation	  began	  to	  fragment.	   Identifying	  such	  
structural	   factors	   helps	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   group	   was	   able	   to	   gain	   traction	  
amongst	   local	   populations.	   Grievances	   and	   increasingly	   manifesting	   structural	  
factors	  provide	  fertile	  ground	  for	  ISIS	  to	  cultivate	  support,	  which	  would	  be	  furthered	  
with	  the	  external	  penetration	  of	  Syria	  and	  Iraq.	  
Conceptualising	  the	  State	  
Since	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  caliphate	  on	  30th	  June	  2014,	  it	  has	  become	  apparent	  that	  
the	   group	   is	   trying	   to	   organise	   political	   life	   and	   to	   populate	   its	   territory.	   Despite	  
being	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  Islamic	  State	  and	  proclaiming	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
caliphate,	   very	   few	   scholars	   have	   engaged	  with	   questions	   of	   political	   organisation	  
and	   statehood	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   group.32	  By	  questioning	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   ISIS	  
has	  established	  a	  sovereign	  state,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  
group,	   along	   with	   how	   leaders	   have	   been	   able	   to	   regulate	   political	   activity	   and	  
reconcile	  tensions	  within	  its	  citizenry.	  
Conventional	  understandings	  of	  sovereignty	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  canon	  of	  Western	  
philosophy	   and	   fuse	   external	   principles	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   with	   domestic	  
understandings	   of	   political	   organisation.	   Grounded	   in	   the	  work	   of	   Grotius,	  Weber	  
and	  more	  recently,	  the	  likes	  of	  Stephen	  Krasner	  and	  James	  Caporaso,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  
number	   of	   shared	   characteristics	   can	   be	   identified	   across	   these	   approaches,	  
including	   clearly	   defined	   borders,	   a	   citizen	   body	   and	   hierarchies	   of	   authority.33	  
Despite	   this	   apparent	   agreement,	   there	   are	   serious	   problems	   with	   engaging	   with	  
social,	   economic	   and	   political	   life	   within	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   state	   as	   a	   fixed	   unit	   of	  
sovereign	  space.34	  Indeed,	   regimes	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	   face	  pressures	   from	  sub	  and	  
supra	   state	   identities	  and	   ideologies,	  along	  with	   tribal	  dynamics	  and	   the	  economic	  
and	   social	   forces	   that	   emerged	   in	   late	   2010	   and	   characterised	   the	  Arab	  Uprisings.	  
When	  such	  identities	  are	  instrumentalised	  and	  used	  politically,	  this	  can	  have	  serious	  
ramifications	   for	  authority	  of	  neighbouring	   states	  and	   the	  existence	  of	   such	   forces	  
can	  undermine	  the	  notion	  of	  territoriality	  within	  neatly	  defined	  territorial	  areas.	  
Article	  2	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  articulates	  the	  sovereign	  equality	  of	  all	  of	  its	  members,35	  
with	   those	   members	   referred	   to	   as	   states,	   in	   a	   circular	   move.	   To	   argue	   such	   a	  
position	  makes	  a	  number	  of	  assumptions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  nature	  and	  equality	  of	  
sovereign	  states.	  By	  being	  a	  member	  state	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  it	  is	  then	  assumed	  
that	  said	  state	  is	  sovereign,	  regardless	  of	  the	  machinations	  of	  domestic	  sovereignty	  
yet	   there	  are	   forms	  of	  political	  organisation	   that	   lack	  external	   recognition	  seem	  to	  
tick	  all	  of	  the	  other	  criteria	  for	  being	  considered	  a	  state.	  
For	   Krasner,	   conventional	   understandings	   of	   sovereignty	   are	   comprised	   of	   three	  
elements:	  international	  legal,	  Westphalian	  and	  domestic,36	  operating	  simultaneously	  
and	   underpinning	   this	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐interference,	   derived	   from	   the	   1648	  
Peace	  of	  Westphalia.37	  It	   is	   this	   idea	  of	  domestic	   sovereignty	   that	   is	  of	   interest	   for	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our	  inquiry.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Krasner,	  Caporaso	  focuses	  more	  on	  the	  domestic	  level	  and	  
provides	  a	  conceptual	  engagement	  with	  notions	  of	  domestic	  sovereignty,	  suggesting	  
that	   it	   is	   comprised	   of	   the	   interaction	   of	   3	   areas:	   authority,	   territoriality	   and	  
citizenship,	   underpinned	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   autonomy.	   Indeed,	   for	   Caporaso,	   it	   is	  
perhaps	  easier	  to	  recognise	  the	  whole,	  rather	  than	  the	  constituent	  parts,38	  yet	  these	  
parts	  are	   important	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  “none	  both	   logically	  entails	  and	  exhausts	  the	  
meanings	  of	  the	  others”.39	  	  
The	  ISIS	  state-­‐building	  effort	  seeks	  to	  do	  similar	  things,	  developing	  an	  entity	  that	   is	  
far	  greater	   than	   the	  sum	  of	   its	  parts.	   Identifying	  component	  parts	  of	   the	   ISIS	   state	  
building	  project	  facilitate	  greater	  awareness	  of	  strategies	  and	  techniques.	  Indeed,	  by	  
focussing	   upon	   the	   interaction	   of	   these	   themes,	  we	   can	   identify	   and	   engage	  with	  
challenges	   that	  emerge	  and	   impact	  upon	   the	  group.	   In	   a	   report	   for	   the	   think	   tank	  
Quilliam,	   Charlie	  Winter	   notes	   that	   over	   half	   of	   the	  material	   in	  Dabiq	   is	   focussed	  
upon	  depicting	  life	  in	  the	  caliphate,	  with	  a	  “preponderate	  focus	  upon	  the	  ‘caliphate’	  
utopia”.40	  Given	  the	  prominence	  of	   life	   in	  the	  caliphate	  within	  Dabiq,	  we	  must	  also	  
understand	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  organisation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  regulating	   life,	  under	  
Caliph	  Ibrahim.	  Within	  discussions	  of	  sovereignty,	  the	  idea	  of	  autonomy	  is	  driven	  by	  
the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐interference.	  Clearly,	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  of	  ISIS,	  there	  are	  
a	  number	  of	  problems,	  both	  external	  and	  internal,	  which	  erode	  ideas	  of	  autonomy.	  
Tensions	   stemming	   from	   problems	   of	   territoriality	   and	   authority	   mean	   that	  
autonomy	  is	  challenged	  externally	  and	  internally,	  with	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  resisting	  the	  
rule	  of	  the	  group.41	  By	  identifying	  the	  component	  parts	  and	  tensions	  between	  them,	  
we	  are	  able	  to	  engage	  with	  ISIS	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  
Authority	  	  
Authority	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  can	  exist	  in	  multiple	  forms,	  often	  in	  conjunction	  with	  one	  
another	  yet	  also	  in	  tension.	  For	  many,	  authority	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  force,	  
or	  power;	  for	  Max	  Weber,	  sovereignty	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  monopoly	  on	  the	  
legitimate	  use	  of	  force,42	  yet	  this	  is	  an	  oversimplification.	  While	  force	  often	  relates	  to	  
authority,	   there	   are	   power	   relations	   within	   a	   relationship	   between	   the	   individual	  
exercising	   force	  and	   the	  one	  on	  whom	  force	   is	  being	  exercised.	  As	   such,	  hierarchy	  
plays	   an	   integral	   role	   in	   shaping	   understandings	   of	   authority,	   driven	   by	   mutual	  
recognition	   and	   acceptance	   of	   such	   a	   hierarchy.	   Within	   Western	   states,	   this	  
hierarchy	   corresponds	   neatly	   with	   the	   territorial	   borders	   of	   the	   state	   and	   a	  
hierarchical	  structure	  ends	  with	  the	  ruler	  at	  the	  zenith	  of	  the	  structure.	  	  
	  
The	  application	  of	  this	  concept	  to	  ISIS	  –	  and	  indeed	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world	  generally	  
–	   appears	   somewhat	   problematic,	   given	   that	   this	   concept	   is	   couched	   in	   Western	  
philosophy.	  Moreover,	  given	  that	  the	  group	  established	  a	  caliphate,	   it	  appears	  that	  
ultimate	   authority	  must	   rest	  with	  God.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   a	   distinction	  must	   be	  made	  
between	  authority	  from	  God	  and	  the	  authority	  that	  is	  found	  within	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  
ISIS’s	  political	   structures.	  Within	   this,	   there	   is	   a	   very	  explicit	   hierarchical	   structure,	  
beginning	  with	  Al	  Baghdadi	  and	  under	  him,	  a	  bureaucratic	  organisational	  structure.	  
Within	   this	   structure	   are	   a	   number	   of	   ministries,	   including	   finance,	   transport,	  
security,	  foreign	  fighters	  and	  media.	  Supporting	  Al	  Baghdadi	  is	  a	  cabinet	  of	  advisors,	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who	   help	   to	   ensure	   that	   policies	   conform	   to	   ISIS’s	   ideological	   view.43	  Occupying	   a	  
number	   of	   these	   prominent	   positions	   are	   a	   number	   of	   former	   Ba’athist	   officers,	  
whose	  military	  experience	  has	  proved	  invaluable.44	  
	  
Given	  the	  importance	  of	  tribal	  dynamics	  across	  Iraq	  and	  Syria,	  ISIS	  has	  had	  to	  secure	  
the	  support	  of	  key	  leaders	   in	  order	  to	  both	  populate	  the	  caliphate	  and	  to	  maintain	  
stability.	   Such	   efforts	   are	   documented	   in	   the	   first	   issue	   of	  Dabiq,	   which	   articulate	  
ISIS’s	   “extensive	   history	   of	   building	   relations	  with	   the	   tribes”.45	  The	   head	   of	   tribal	  
affairs	  met	  with	  elders	  and	  dignitaries	  of	  the	  tribes	  Albu	  Khamis,	  Banu	  Sa’id,	  Al-­‐‘Awn,	  
Al	  Khafsah	  and	  Al-­‐Ghanim.	   	  Dabiq	  also	  documents	  how	  ISIS	  has	  acted	   in	  respect	  of	  
tribal	  norms	  and	  customs	  while	  detailing	  how	  they	  had	  returned	  rights	  and	  property	  
to	   rightful	  owners,	  provided	   security	  and	   stability,	   and	   reduced	  crime.46	  Pledges	  of	  
allegiance	   also	   included	   agreements	   about	   shared	   financial	   revenues	   along	   with	  
promoting	  loyal	  tribal	  leaders,	  allowing	  them	  to	  control	  a	  small	  territory.	  By	  pledging	  
bayaa	   (the	   oath	   of	   allegiance)	   to	   ISIS,	   tribes	   gain	   from	   aid	   and	   non-­‐coercion	   by	  
pledging	  loyalty.	  Moreover,	  tribal	  differences	  have	  also	  been	  exacerbated.	  From	  this,	  
one	   can	   see	   how	   religious	   authority	   has	   been	   fused	   with	   tribal	   authority	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  political	  organization.	  
	  
From	   this	   period	   of	   consolidation,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   group	   has	   expansionist	  
aspirations	  
the	  Islamic	  State	  will	  remain.	  It	  will	  remain	  because	  it	  was	  built	  upon	  the	  corpses	  of	  
martyrs.	   It	   will	   remain	   because	   the	   success	   granted	   by	   Allah	   in	   this	   Jihad	   is	  more	  
obvious	   than	   the	   sun	   is	   the	   center	   of	   the	   sky.	   (...)	   It	  will	   remain	   because	   it	   is	   the	  
supplication	   of	   the	   oppressed,	   the	   scream	   of	   the	   prisoners	   and	   the	   hope	   of	   the	  
orphans.	  The	  Islamic	  State	  is	  here	  to	  stay	  even	  all	  the	  Christians,	  Jews	  and	  apostates	  
despite	  such.	  And	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  spread	  to	  all	  corners	  of	  the	  Earth.47	  
The	  fusion	  of	  religious	  and	  tribal	  authority	  within	  the	  context	  of	  political	  organization	  
serves	  as	  a	  means	  of	  deriving	  support	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  people	  across	  different	  
contexts.	   Of	   course,	   it	   also	   subsumes	   structures	   that	   may	   have	   also	   emerged	   in	  
opposition	  to	  ISIS.	  
Territoriality	  	  
Territoriality	   is	   primarily	   concerned	  with	   the	   organisation	   of	   political	   space	  within	  
clearly	  defined	  territorial	  borders,	  or,	  in	  Caporaso’s	  words,	  when	  “the	  legal	  reach	  of	  
public	   authority	   is	   coterminous	   with	   certain	   spatial	   boundaries”.48	  Ultimately,	   it	   is	  
the	  exercising	  of	  politics	  across	  the	  territory.	  Caporaso	  notes	  that	  territoriality	  may	  
be	   challenged	  when	  alternative	   sources	  of	   authority	   confront	   the	   authority	   that	   is	  
seeking	  to	  exercise	  control	  within	  territorial	  borders.	  In	  securing	  the	  support	  of	  tribal	  
leaders,	  ISIS	  was	  able	  to	  establish	  governance	  structures	  and	  a	  constitution	  to	  ensure	  
stability	   and	   security	   across	   the	   caliphate.	  Documents	   obtained	   by	   The	   Guardian,	  
revealed	  the	   ISIS	  plan	  to	  regulate	  activity49	  and	   in	  a	  chapter	  on	  administration,	   the	  
document	  detailed	  steps	  to	  be	  taken:	  
	  
1.	  Preparing	  special	  sharia	  sessions	  in	  the	  camps	  in	  coordination	  with	  the	  al-­‐Buhuth	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and	  al-­‐Eftaa	  [fatwa	  –	  legal	  opinion]	  committee.	  
2.	  Preparing	  educational	  programmes	  to	  teach	  the	  Arabic	  language	  and	  recitation	  of	  
the	  Qur’an	  in	  coordination	  with	  the	  Diwan	  al-­‐Ta’aleem	  [department	  of	  education]	  
for	  every	  province.	  
3.	  Preparing	  military	  programmes	  teaching	  the	  types	  of	  weapons	  and	  military	  tactics	  
with	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  military	  commander	  in	  every	  province.	  
4.	  Studying	  expenditures	  and	  allowances	  for	  every	  camp	  whose	  study	  and	  analysis	  
are	  to	  be	  completed	  by	  the	  military	  leader	  or	  wali	  [governor]	  of	  every	  area	  according	  
to	  the	  needs	  connected	  with	  every	  wilaya	  [province]	  and	  submitting	  the	  study	  to	  the	  
wali.	  
5.	  Overseeing	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  educational	  and	  training	  staff	  in	  the	  camp.	  
6.	  Putting	  in	  place	  detailed	  planning	  and	  programmes	  on	  the	  course	  of	  the	  battle.	  
7.	  Tracking	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  camp	  according	  to	  the	  defined	  programmes.	  
8.	   Assessing	   the	   camp	   session	   and	   raising	   a	   report	   to	   the	   officials	   concerning	   the	  
readiness	  of	  the	  session	  after	  the	  camp.50	  
	  
Such	  analysis	  can	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  governance	  strategies	  and	  theological	  roots	  of	  the	  
project	   and	   ultimately	   reveal	   a	   great	   deal	   about	   ISIS.	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   governance	  
structures,	   which	   after	   all,	   is	   what	   territoriality	   is	   comprised	   of,	   are	   conventional	  
institutions	  of	  state	  that	  have	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  group’s	  theological	  influences.	  	  	  	  
	  
Theological	   roots,	   discussed	   in	   greater	   detail	   below,	   are	   responsible	   for	   shaping	  
governance	   strategies.51	  Through	   its	  Sharia	   courts,	   ISIS	   can	  conduct	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
governance	   activity,	   ranging	   from	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods	   and	   services	   to	  
creating	  laws,	  enforced	  by	  the	  Islamic	  Police.52	  In	  late	  2014,	  MEMRI	  obtained	  the	  ISIS	  
penal	  code,	  which	  set	  out	  the	  hudud	  (Quranic	  punishments)	  for	  a	  range	  of	  offences.	  
The	  more	   serious	   offences	   including	   blasphemy,	   sodomy,	   spying	   for	   ‘unbelievers’,	  
adultery,	   apostasy,	   and	   murder	   are	   punishable	   by	   death.	   Lesser	   offences	   carry	   a	  
range	   of	   punishments:	   theft	   results	   in	   the	   loss	   of	   a	   hand,	   drinking	   alcohol	   and	  
slandering	   are	   both	   punished	   by	   80	   lashes	   and	   for	   terrorizing	   people,	   the	  
punishment	  is	  exile.53	  ISIS	  leaders	  in	  Nineveh	  province	  in	  Iraq	  created	  a	  ‘contract	  of	  
the	   city’,	   which	   set	   out	   16	   points	   for	   residents.	   These	   16	   points	   included	   the	  
implementation	   of	   a	   Salafist	   inspired	   Sharia	   law,	   encouragement	   to	   respect	   all	  
Muslims,	  except	   for	   those	  allied	  to	  oppressors,	   to	  perform	  prayers	  with	  the	  group,	  
preventing	  women	   travelling	   outside,	   banning	   political	   and	   armed	   groups	   and	   the	  
banning	  of	  drugs,	  alcohol	  and	  cigarettes.	  Underpinning	  all	  of	  this	  were	  the	  religious	  
views	   of	   the	   Wahhabi	   inspired	   Salafism,	   which	   is	   vehemently	   anti	   Shi’a,	   which	  
remains	   a	   common	   theme	   across	   Dabiq	   but	   also	   in	   structural	   grievances	   amongst	  
Sunni	  communities.54	  	  
	  	  
Of	  course,	  a	  serious	  challenge	  facing	  ISIS	  stems	  from	  the	  conflict	  that	  is	  resulting	  in	  a	  
seemingly	   perennial	   redrawing	   of	   borders.	   In	   engaging	   in	   conflict	   with	   a	   range	   of	  
actors	  on	  a	  number	  of	  different	  fronts,	  gains	  and	  losses	  mean	  that	  borders	  are	  in	  a	  
state	  of	  flux	  and	  from	  this,	   it	   is	  difficult	  to	  exercise	  political	  control	  over	  areas	  that	  
are	   contested.	   Moreover,	   given	   that	   in	   certain	   areas,	   authority	   is	   also	   contested,	  
territorial	   control	   is	   increasingly	   problematic.	   Yet	   in	   those	   areas	   that	   control	   is	  
exercised,	   one	   can	   learn	   a	   great	   deal	   about	   the	   group	   in	   examining	   the	   type	   of	  
governance	  structures	  that	  are	  in	  place.55	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In	  an	  article	  written	  in	  issue	  8	  by	  John	  Cantlie,	  the	  development	  of	  ISIS	  institutions	  is	  
outlined	  
	  
I	  am	  certainly	  no	  expert	  on	  such	  matters	  and	  my	  views	  are	  those	  of	  a	   layman,	  but	  
generally	   one	   doesn’t	   expect	   a	  mere	   “organization”	   to	   lay	   siege	   to	   cities	   or	   have	  
their	   own	   police	   force.	   You	   certainly	   don’t	   expect	   a	   mere	   “organization”	   to	   have	  
tanks	   and	   artillery	   pieces,	   an	   army	  of	   soldiers	   tens	   of	   thousands	   strong,	   and	   their	  
own	  spy	  drones.	  And	  one	  certainly	  doesn’t	  expect	  a	  mere	  “organization”	  to	  have	  a	  
mint	  with	  plans	  to	  produce	  their	  own	  currency,	  primary	  schools	  for	  the	  young,	  and	  a	  
functioning	  court	  system.	  These,	  surely,	  are	  all	  hallmarks	  of	  (whisper	  it	  if	  you	  dare)	  a	  
country.56	  
	  
Cantlie	  is	  correct	  to	  stress	  that	  this	  project	  bears	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  a	  country,	  yet	  we	  
should	  not	  be	  surprised,	  given	  that	  Dabiq	  explicitly	  documents	  the	  group’s	  efforts	  to	  
build	  “a	  complete	  society	  for	  Muslims.”57	  
	  
Citizenship	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  project	  of	  political	  organisation	  is	  a	  requirement	  to	  have	  
something	   to	   organise	   and,	   in	   order	   to	   lay	   claim	   to	   governance,	   those	  within	   the	  
territory	  must	  comply.	  Within	  a	  state	  building	  project,	  citizens	  are	  an	   integral	  part.	  
Of	  course,	  this	  citizen	  body	  is	  comprised	  of	  people	  who	  support	  the	  ideological	  vision	  
of	  the	  group,	  people	  who	  turn	  to	  the	  group	  for	  protection	  yet	  do	  not	  support	  their	  
ideological	  vision,	  and	  people	  who	  are	  coerced	  into	  being	  citizens.	  This	  distinction	  is	  
discussed	   in	  more	   detail	   below,	   but	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   a	   range	   of	   different	  
loyalties	  demonstrates	  the	  need	  for	  ISIS	  leaders	  to	  develop	  loyalty	  to	  the	  community	  
through	  a	  range	  of	  different	  strategies.	  
With	  the	  declaration	  of	  a	  caliphate,	  ISIS	  quickly	  sought	  to	  establish	  state	  institutions,	  
a	  bureaucracy	  to	  collect	  taxes	  and	  health	  care,	  to	  be	  imposed	  upon	  a	  citizenry	  within	  
its	  territory.	  Given	  the	  context	  within	  which	  ISIS	  was	  operating,	  the	  need	  for	  a	  larger	  
–	  and	  more	  skilled	  –	  population	  was	  imperative.	  In	  November	  2014	  it	  was	  reported	  
that	  ISIS	  had	  advertised	  for	  an	  ‘ideologically	  suitable’	  oil	  refinery	  manager,	  albeit	  at	  a	  
salary	   much	   lower	   than	   the	   market	   rate. 58 	  In	   some	   instances,	   ISIS	   advertised	  
particular	   jobs	   and	   in	   the	   first	   issue	  of	  Dabiq	   there	  was	   an	  open	   call	   for	   “doctors,	  
engineers,	  scholars	  and	  specialists”.59	  In	  most	  cases	  the	  group	  relies	  on	  calls	  to	  make	  
hijra,	  yet	  to	  do	  this,	  one	  must	  feel	  compelled	  to	  travel	  and	  ultimately,	  safe	  to	  do	  so.	  
Indeed,	  for	  many,	  travelling	  to	  join	  ISIS	  would	  involve	  breaking	  the	  law	  and	  joining	  a	  
proscribed	  terrorist	  group.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  narratives	  within	  Dabiq	  were	  essential	  in	  
creating	  the	  pull	  factors	  that	  would	  entice	  people	  to	  travel.	  
Within	  the	  first	  issue	  of	  Dabiq,	  ISIS	  is	  very	  clear	  in	  its	  attempt	  to	  appeal	  to	  all	  Sunni	  
Muslims.	   The	  magazine	   portrays	   the	   territory	   as	   “a	   state	  where	   the	   Arab	   and	   the	  
non-­‐Arab,	  the	  white	  man	  and	  the	  black	  man,	  the	  easterner	  and	  the	  westerner	  are	  all	  
brothers”.60	  Of	  course,	  such	  claims	  of	  unity	  extend	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  Sunni	  
Muslims	   and,	   anyone	  who	   seeks	   to	   leave	   or	   defect	   is	   killed.	   The	   passports	   of	   the	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home	  nations	  of	  those	  travelling	  to	  join	  ISIS	  are	  routinely	  burnt	  on	  arrival.	  ISIS	  then	  
employs	   a	   number	   of	   strategies	   to	   protect	   its	   citizens,	   predominantly	   through	  
ensuring	   that	   basic	   needs	   are	   met,	   a	   charge	   previously	   levied	   at	   governments	   in	  
Baghdad	   and	   Damascus.	   Moreover,	   ensuring	   that	   citizens	   are	   protected	   is	   of	  
paramount	   importance,	   given	   that	   the	   group	   draws	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   its	   legitimacy	  
from	   creating	   a	   stable	   environment.	   To	   this	   end,	   police	   and	   judicial	   structures	   are	  
developed,	  implemented	  and	  documented.	  	  
Across	  Dabiq,	  discussions	  of	  the	  umma	  feature	  regularly,	  hardly	  surprising	  as	  ISIS	  is	  
seeking	   to	  position	   itself	   at	   the	  vanguard	  of	   it	   –	   regardless	  of	  what	  other	  Muslims	  
may	  think	  of	  the	  group	  -­‐	  albeit	  an	  umma	  defined	   in	  exclusionary	  terms.	  As	  such,	   it	  
seeks	  to	  develop	  a	  notion	  of	  cohesion	  amongst	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  achieved	  by	  utilizing	  
two	   narratives,	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   below.	   Moreover,	   given	   the	   nature	   of	  
political	  organization	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Al	  Baghdadi,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  struggle	  to	  
maintain	   the	   support	   of	   citizens,	   reflecting	   the	   organic	   nature	   of	   ISIS.61	  The	   group	  
also	   seeks	   to	   convert	   locals	   to	   its	   ideological	   viewpoint.	   From	   this,	   two	   main	  
narratives	  emerge	   that	   seek	   to	  bolster	   the	   ranks	  of	   ISIS	  while	  maintaining	   support	  
from	   those	   within	   the	   territory	   controlled	   by	   the	   group,	   both	   natives	   of	   Iraq	   and	  
Syria	  and	  those	  who	  have	  made	  hijra,	  a	  great	  number	  of	  whom	  are	  unable	  to	  read	  
Arabic.	  	  
To	  this	  end,	  the	  authors	  of	  Dabiq	  have	  sought	  to	  create	  an	  appealing	  narrative	  and	  
an	  image	  of	  strength.	  Before	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  Osama	  Bin	  Laden	  told	  the	  story	  that	  
when	   an	   individual	   is	   faced	   with	   two	   horses,	   (s)he	   will	   automatically	   choose	   the	  
strong	   horse.62	  For	   Bin	   Laden,	   this	   strong	   horse	   was	   Al	   Qa’ida,	   yet	   the	   same	   idea	  
applies	   to	   ISIS	   whose	   proclamation	   of	   a	   caliphate	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   declaration	   of	  
strength.	  This	  message	  of	  strength	  can	  be	  found	  across	  Dabiq	  from	  the	  presentation	  
and	  construction	  of	   the	  magazine	   to	   the	  content	  of	   the	  articles.	  This	   image	   is	  also	  
seen	   in	   the	   group’s	   videos,	   where	   the	   audience	   is	   reminded	   of	   images	   from	  
Guantanamo	   Bay,	   albeit	   with	   the	   inversion	   of	   power	   relations.	   Building	   on	   this	  
narrative	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   increase	   the	   cohesion	   between	   supporters	   while	   also	  
proliferating	   the	   group’s	   appeal	   globally.	   In	   addition,	   the	   group	   has	   explicitly	  
attempted	   to	   “remove	   the	   grey	   zone”	   between	   an	   understanding	   of	   issues	  within	  
binary	  terms,	  to	  frame	  the	  conflict	  with	  ISIS	  in	  Manichean	  terms.	  Yet	  the	  removal	  of	  
this	   grey	   zone	   also	   can	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   sectarian	   struggle,	   between	  
Sunni	   and	   Shi’a,	   and	   between	   Arabs	   and	   Iranians.	   Framing	   this	   conflict	   in	   binary	  
terms	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  means	  of	  recruitment	  for	  the	  caliphate	  and	  to	  solidify	  support	  
from	  Sunni	  Muslims	  across	  the	  region.	  	  
Narratives	   play	   an	   integral	   part	   in	   shaping	   the	   ISIS	   vision	   and	   facilitating	   greater	  
cohesion	   within	   its	   community.	   Winter	   unpacks	   the	   media	   strategy	   of	   ISIS,	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  brand	  is	  comprised	  of	  6	  narratives:	  brutality,	  mercy,	  victimhood,	  
war,	   belonging	   and	   utopianism. 63 	  Of	   particular	   interest	   to	   this	   article	   are	   two	  
concepts	  –	  asabiyya	  and	  securitization	  –	  that	  straddle	  these	  6	  narratives.	  	  Asabiyya	  is	  
integral	  with	   regard	   to	   creating	   the	   notion	   of	   belonging	  while	   securitization	   feeds	  
into	  narratives	  of	  war	  and	  victimhood.	  Of	  particular	   interest	   is	   the	  securitization	  of	  
Shi’a	  Muslims	  –	   the	  near	  enemy	  –	  given	   the	   conditions	   in	  both	  Syria	   and	   Iraq	  and	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manipulation	  of	  Sunni	  Muslims	  by	  Shi’a	  actors.64	  Engaging	  the	  construction	  of	  these	  
narratives	  the	  securitization	  process	  helps	  to	  understand	  how	  ISIS	  is	  able	  to	  speak	  to	  
its	  citizens,	  while	  also	  appealing	  to	  Muslims	  across	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  the	  interaction	  of	  
these	   themes	   that	   will	   increase	   support	   and	   morale	   amongst	   those	   under	   ISIS	  
control	  while	  also	  leading	  to	  individuals	  making	  hijra.	  	  
Religious	  Asabiyya	  
An	   integral	   aspect	   of	   the	   ISIS	  message	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   construct	   a	   community	   of	  
Sunni	   Muslims,	   referred	   to	   as	   asabiyya,	   or	   kinship	   within	   the	   context	   of	   political	  
organisation.	  The	  concept	  was	  first	  articulated	  by	  Ibn	  Khaldoun	  in	  The	  Muqaddimah,	  
where	   he	   set	   out	   to	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   of	   tribal	   societies	   and	   political	  
organisation.	   For	   Khaldun,	   a	   collective	   will	   only	   be	   successful	   by	   developing	   close	  
ties,	   which	   “strengthens	   their	   stamina	   and	  makes	   them	   feared,	   since	   everybody’s	  
affection	  for	  his	  family	  and	  group	  is	  more	  important”.65	  Khaldun	  suggests	  that	  if	  such	  
an	   argument	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   homestead	   then	   it	   can	   be	   applied	  writ	   large	  
across	  a	  state.	  From	  this,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  cultivate	  asabiyya	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  
a	  shared	  identity	  within	  a	  newly	  constructed	  entity.	  Such	  a	  strategy	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  
Benedict	   Anderson’s	   idea	   of	   ‘imagined	   communities’,66	  although	   for	   Khaldun	   it	   is	  
constructed	   on	   a	   much	   more	   personal	   level.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   while	  
Khaldun’s	  concept	  of	  asabiyya	  is	  related	  to	  tribal	  dynamics,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  
religious	  cohesion.	  Indeed,	  if	  one	  reads	  Khaldun’s	  work,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  grounded	  
in	  Islamic	  thought.	  
For	   Khaldun,	   group	   feeling	   emerges	   from	   blood	   ties	   and,	   in	   quoting	   the	   prophet,	  
Khaldun	   stresses	   the	   need	   to	   “learn	   as	  much	   of	   your	   pedigree	   as	   is	   necessary	   to	  
establish	  your	  ties	  of	  blood	  relationship”.67	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  
ideas	   of	   authority	   within	   the	   context	   of	   asabiyya.	   Authority,	   in	   Khaldun’s	   work,	  
stems	   from	  superiority,	  which	   “emerges	   from	  group	   feeling.	  Only	  by	  God’s	  help	   in	  
establishing	  this	  religion	  do	  individual	  desires	  come	  together	  in	  agreement	  to	  press	  
their	  claims,	  and	  hearts	  become	  united”.68	  This	  idea	  would	  feature	  prominently	  in	  Al	  
Baghdadi’s	  belief	  that	  he	  is	  operating	  with	  God’s	  help	  and	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
community	  of	  Muslims	  under	  his	  support,	  claims	  and	  hearts	  appear	  to	  have	  become	  
united.69	  
Efforts	   to	   construct	   asabiyya	   feature	   prominently	   across	   Dabiq,	   with	   the	   authors	  
seeking	  to	  stress	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  Sunni	  Muslims	  and	  the	  umma,	  achieved	  in	  
part	  by	  developing	  links	  with	  tribes	  across	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  and	  drawing	  support	  from	  
the	  grievances	  amongst	  Sunnis	   in	  these	  communities.	  Articles	   in	  Dabiq	  also	  seek	  to	  
stress	  the	  quality	  of	   life	   in	  the	  caliphate,	  once	  more	  aiming	  to	   improve	  morale	  and	  
portray	  a	  positive	  image	  to	  Sunni	  Muslims.	  The	  concept	  of	  asabiyya	  is	  integral	  within	  
the	  state	  building	  project,	  both	  underpinning	  governance	  strategies	  and	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
strategy	  to	  build	  ties	  with	  Muslims	  across	  the	  world.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  issue	  of	  Dabiq,	  the	  magazine	  stressed	  that	  	  
the	  time	  has	  come	  for	  the	  Ummah	  of	  Muhammad	  (sallallahu	  ‘alayhi	  wa	  sallam)	   to	  
wake	  up	  from	  its	  sleep,	  remove	  the	  garments	  of	  dishonor,	  and	  shake	  off	  the	  dust	  of	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humiliation	  and	  disgrace,	   for	   the	  era	  of	   lamenting	  and	  moaning	  has	  gone,	  and	   the	  
dawn	  of	  honor	  has	  emerged	  anew.70	  
The	  second	   issue	  goes	  a	  step	   further	  by	  detailing	   the	  availability	  of	  welfare	  “There	  
are	  homes	  here	  for	  you	  and	  your	  families.	  You	  can	  be	  a	  major	  contributor	  towards	  
the	   liberation	   of	   Makkah,	   Madīnah,	   and	   al-­‐Quds.	   Would	   you	   not	   like	   to	   reach	  
Judgment	  Day	  with	  these	  grand	  deeds	  in	  your	  scales”.71	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  group	  seeks	  
to	  stress	  not	  only	  the	  responsibility	  of	  Muslims	  to	  make	  hijra	  but	  also	  the	  capability	  
of	   ISIS	   to	   provide	   for	   those	   who	   do	   so.	   This	   level	   of	   support	   also	   involves	   the	  
provision	  of	  guidance	  to	  the	  “noble	  widows	  of	  the	  blessed	  shuhada”,72	  those	  women	  
whose	  husbands	  are	  martyred.	  	  
Supporting	  this	  are	  references	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  welfare	  to	  those	  in	  need,	  including	  
the	   provision	   of	   support	   to	   orphans,	   particularly	   through	   the	   distribution	   of	  
ghanimah	   (finances	   gained	   through	  war).	   Across	   the	   issues,	   the	  magazine	   stresses	  
the	   hard	   line	   taken	   against	   crime	   in	   the	   caliphate,	   with	   photographic	   evidence	   of	  
punishments	   for	   theft,	   drug	   smuggling,	   hashish	   and	   cigarettes.	   Efforts	   to	   cultivate	  
asabiyya	  are	  at	   the	  heart	  of	  both	   the	  state	  building	  project	  and	  broader	  efforts	   to	  
create	   a	   community	   amongst	   those	   residing	   within	   its	   territory,	   regardless	   of	  
ideological	  vision.	  
Securitization	  
The	  second	  aspect	  of	  the	  ISIS	  narrative	  is	  the	  attempt	  to	  securitize	  particular	  groups.	  
In	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  ideology	  of	  Al	  Qa’ida,	  ISIS	  stresses	  the	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  near	  
enemy,	  the	  Shi’a,	  rather	  than	  the	  far	  enemy,	  the	  US,	  although	  across	  later	  issues	  of	  
Dabiq,	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  to	  attacks	  on	  foreign	  soil.	  By	  stressing	  the	  threat	  posed	  
by	  Shi’a	  Muslims,	  ISIS	  is	  able	  to	  frame	  itself	  at	  the	  vanguard	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  bidah	  
and	  also	   to	  draw	  support	   from	  Sunni	  Muslims	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	   from	  further	  
afield.	  Such	  a	  process	  has	   involved	  securitizing	  the	  Shi’a	  threat	  to	  audiences	  within	  
the	  territory	  that	  ISIS	  controls	  but	  also	  internationally.	  	  
To	  understand	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  process	  of	  securitization	  works,	  one	  must	  revisit	  
the	  work	  of	  Ole	  Waever	  and	  Barry	  Buzan,	  whose	  attempts	  to	  broaden	  the	  security	  
agenda	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  provided	  scope	  to	  include	  a	  range	  of	  other	  issues	  
within	   security	   calculations.73	  Moreover,	   building	   on	   the	   work	   of	   J.L.	   Austen,	   they	  
developed	   the	   idea	   of	   securitization,	   the	   notion	   that	   a	   threat	   can	   be	   framed	   in	   a	  
particular	   way	   for	   a	   particular	   audience.	   For	   Thierry	   Balzacq,	   the	   idea	   of	  
securitization	   is	   the	  articulation	  of	   security	  which	   itself	  creates	  a	  new	  social	  order,	  
bracketing	   normal	   politics.74	  In	   this	   process,	   actors	   respond	   to	   the	   perception	   of	  
threats	   by	   framing	   the	   issue	   as	   an	   existential	   threat	   to	   a	   particular	   audience.	   As	  
Buzan,	  Weaver	  and	  de	  Wilde	  argue,	   	   “in	   security	  discourse,	   an	   issue	   is	  dramatized	  
and	   presented	   as	   an	   issue	   of	   supreme	   priority;	   thus	   by	   labelling	   it	   as	   security	   an	  
agent	  claims	  a	  need	  for	  and	  a	  right	  to	  treat	  it	  by	  extraordinary	  means”.75	  	  
Of	  course,	  not	  all	  securitization	  efforts	  are	  successful,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  threat	  was	  
not	   seen	   in	   existential	   terms	   or	   that	   extra-­‐ordinary	   measures	   required	   by	   the	  
securitizer	  were	   not	   necessary.	   For	   Paul	   Roe,	   this	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	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success;	   instead,	   the	  audience	  may	  accept	   the	   frame	  but	   reject	   the	   implications	  of	  
an	  act	  of	  securitization.76	  Within	  the	  process	  of	  securitization	  there	  is	  typically	  a	  clear	  
–	   and	   direct	   –	   causal	   link	   between	   the	   securitizing	   actor	   and	   the	   audience,	  which	  
typically	  is	  between	  a	  regime	  and	  an	  audience	  located	  within	  the	  state.	  This	  process	  
then	  occurs	  across	  three	  stages:	  the	  first,	  the	  designation	  of	  the	  threat,	  the	  second,	  
the	   facilitating	   conditions,	   and	   the	   third,	   the	   audience.	   There	   are	   of	   course,	   a	  
number	  of	  problems	  with	  this	  process.	  As	  Matt	  McDonald	  correctly	  argues,	  there	  is	  a	  
paucity	  of	  literature	  on	  what	  factors	  feed	  into	  the	  wider	  context	  and	  the	  facilitating	  
conditions.77	  While	   context	   is	   conventionally	   held	   to	   be	   found	   within	   states,	   the	  
nature	  of	  identity	  politics	  coupled	  with	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  means	  
that	  both	  the	  audience	  and	  the	  context	  can	  transcend	  state	  borders.	  
Securitization	  is	  predominantly	  grounded	  in	  a	  Western	  philosophical	  tradition,	  which	  
again	   raises	   a	   number	   of	   serious	   problems.	   When	   studying	   the	   process	   of	  
securitization	  it	  is	  typically	  restricted	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  high	  politics,	  driven	  by	  the	  state	  
at	   the	   expense	   of	   actors	   on	   the	   periphery,	   leaving	   others	   in	   the	   ‘analytical	  
shadows’.78	  It	   also	   possesses	   a	   linear	   structure,	   typically	   confined	   to	   one	   state,	  
where	  a	  regime	  securitizes	  a	  particular	  threat	  to	  an	  audience	  within	  the	  state.	  In	  this	  
case,	   leading	   ISIS	   ideologues	   attempted	   to	   securitize	   the	   Shi’a	   threat	   to	   Sunni	  
Muslims	  within	   the	   territory	   controlled	   by	   the	   group	   and	   to	   Sunni	  Muslims	   across	  
the	  world.	  Such	  a	  strategy	  had	  two	  main	  aims:	  first,	  to	  cultivate	   loyalty	  from	  those	  
within	   the	  territory	  and	  second,	   to	  encourage	  people	   to	   travel	   to	  Syria	  and	   Iraq	  to	  
fight	  against	  the	  Shi’a	  threat.	  	  
Framing	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  as	  a	   threat	   is	  not	  unique	   to	   ISIS,	   rather,	   this	  position	  draws	  
upon	  Wahhabist	   thought.	   As	  Muhammad	   Ibn	   Abd	   al-­‐Wahhab	  wrote,	   “One’s	   Islam	  
cannot	  be	  sound,	  even	  if	  they	  adhered	  to	  the	  oneness	  of	  God	  and	  worshipped	  none	  
but	  God,	  without	  enmity	  to	  the	  polytheists	  and	  showing	  to	  them	  hate	  and	  hostility.”	  
Such	   a	  position	   requires	  Muslims	   to	   take	  direct	   action	   against	   polytheists	   and	   this	  
requirement	   is	   part	   of	   tawhid	   as	   preached	   by	   Ibn	   Taymiyyah,	   the	   ideological	  
visionary	  behind	  the	  Wahhabist	  movement.	  Taymiyyah,	  writing	   in	  the	  15th	  century,	  
sought	  to	  excommunicate	  Shi’a	  and	  Sufi	  Muslims	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  their	  religious	  
practice	   and	   belief,	   including	   (but	   not	   limited)	   to	   the	   veneration	   of	   Imams.79	  It	   is	  
then	  clear	  that	  securitization	  narratives	  build	  on	  history	  and	  theology,	  stressing	  the	  
negative	  impact	  of	  external	  actors.	  “Aspects	  of	  kufr	  crept	  into	  Muslim	  lands	  by	  way	  
of	  Sufi	  and	  Rafidi	   infiltration.	  Grave-­‐worship	  became	  widespread	  and	  the	  authority	  
of	  Allah	  was	   challenged	  by	   Turkish,	   Persian,	   and	  even	  Arab	   kings”.80	  As	   Taymiyyah	  
suggested,	  “The	  origin	  of	  all	  sedition	  and	  calamity	  is	  Shia	  and	  their	  allies,	  and	  many	  
of	  the	  swords	  unleashed	  against	  Islam	  come	  from	  them.”81	  Taymiyyah’s	  work	  plays	  a	  
fundamental	   role	  within	   the	   ideological	   vision	  of	   ISIS,	   helping	   the	   group	   appeal	   to	  
more	   fundamentalist	   Sunni	  Muslims	  but	   also	   guiding	   their	   political	   strategy.	  Given	  
that	  the	  securitization	  narrative	  speaks	  to	  Sunnis	  both	  in	  the	  region	  and	  externally,	  
the	   conditions	   affecting	   the	   audience	   will	   help	   the	   securitization	   narrative	   find	  
traction.	  	  
The	   facilitating	   conditions	   and	   context	   are	   found	   in	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   political	  
organization	   across	   the	   Middle	   East,	   along	   with	   discrimination	   against	   Sunnis.	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Indeed,	  when	  Sunnis	  across	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  have	  been	  marginalized	  and	  subjected	  to	  
violence	  from	  the	  state	  and	  militias,	  the	  securitization	  narrative	  will	  find	  a	  receptive	  
audience,	  particularly	  when	  external	  actors	  support	  the	  state	  and	  militias.	  	  The	  other	  
term	  that	  is	  prominent	  in	  the	  securitization	  narrative	  is	  Safawi,	  which	  is	  framed	  as	  a	  
political	   cult	   of	   the	   “Twelver	   Rafidah”,	   and	   places	   great	   credence	   on	   Persian	  
language	  and	  culture.82	  	  As	  issue	  13	  notes,	  
Initiated	  by	  a	   sly	   Jew,	   they	  are	  an	  apostate	   sect	  drowning	   in	  worship	  of	   the	  dead,	  
cursing	   the	   best	   companions	   and	  wives	   of	   the	   Prophet	   g,	   spreading	   doubt	   on	   the	  
very	  basis	  of	  the	  religion	  (the	  Qur’ān	  and	  the	  Sunnah),	  defaming	  the	  very	  honor	  of	  
the	   Prophet,	   and	   preferring	   their	   “twelve”	   imāms	   to	   the	   prophets	   and	   even	   to	  
Allah!83 
With	  the	  penetration	  of	  Iraq	  by	  Iran	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  US-­‐led	  invasion,84	  there	  
was	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐Iranian	  sentiment	  which	  was	  also	  fused	  with	  the	  anti-­‐
Shi’a	  sentiment	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  ISIS’s	  message.	  Such	  sentiments	  also	  feature	  in	  other	  
media	   statements,	   one	  of	  which	   called	  on	   supporters	  not	   to	   “give	  up	  one	   span	  of	  
land	   that	   you	  have	   liberated,	   and	  do	  not	   let	   the	  Rawafid	   step	  upon	   it	   except	  over	  
your	  body	  parts”.85	  
The	  securitization	  moves	  also	  facilitates	  the	  process	  of	  dehumanization,	  an	   integral	  
part	   of	   the	   move	   to	   violence.	   Part	   of	   this	   process	   noted	   “the	   permissibility	   of	  
excessiveness	   against	   the	   rafidha,”	   and	   the	   process	  was	   replete	  with	   abusive	   and	  
denigrating	  language	  directed	  at	  Shia.	  86	  This	  rhetoric	  has	  also	  manifested	  in	  action.	  
ISIS	   established	   the	   Rafidah	   Hunters	   –	   anti-­‐Shi’a	   assassins	   who	   attack	   Shi’a	   Iraqis	  
who	  are	  joining	  ‘Safavid’	  army	  units.87	  	  
It	   is	  clear	  to	  see	  how	  the	  securitization	  process	  gained	  traction.	  The	  designation	  of	  
the	   threat	   in	   Dabiq	   and	   in	   speeches	   from	   prominent	   members	   of	   ISIS	   gains	  
momentum	   when	   taken	   together	   with	   the	   facilitating	   conditions,	   which	   have	  
resulted	  in	  the	  deaths	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Sunnis	  across	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  since	  
2003,	   along	   with	   the	   exclusion	   from	   political,	   social	   and	   economic	   life.	   Having	  
experienced	  such	  conditions,	  the	  securitization	  narrative	  resonates	  amongst	  people	  
in	   the	   region	  but	  also	  amongst	   those	  across	   the	  world	  who	  are	  concerned	  by	  how	  
their	   sectarian	  kin	  are	  affected.	  The	   securitization	  process	  plays	  an	   integral	  part	   in	  
attempting	   to	   unite	   a	   divided	   community	   in	   opposition	   to	   another,	   which	   is	  
particularly	  important	  as	  it	  is	  couched	  in	  the	  theological	  view	  of	  Ibn	  Taymiyyah.	  	  
Audiences	  and	  Support	  
Such	  securitization	  processes	  require	  an	  audience	  in	  order	  to	  find	  traction	  and	  to	  be	  
successful.	  While	   ISIS	   has	   been	   able	   to	   capitalise	   on	   long-­‐standing	   grievances	   and	  
marginalisation,	   it	  would	   be	   remiss	   to	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   cohesion	   amongst	   the	  
support	   it	   has	   gained.	   Rather,	   those	   residing	   within	   ISIS	   controlled	   territory	   have	  
little	  in	  common	  other	  than	  residing	  in	  this	  area.	  Much	  like	  support	  for	  groups	  that	  
employ	  violence	  as	  a	   tactic,	  as	  Brandon	  Boylan	  suggests,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  make	  a	  
distinction	   “behavioural	   (active	   and	   passive)	   and	   induced	   (enticed	   and	   coerced)	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continuums	  of	  support”.88	  Such	  a	  distinction	  must	  be	  applied	  to	   those	   living	  within	  
ISIS	  controlled	  territory	  but	  also	  to	  those	  who	  travel	  to	  join	  the	  group.	  	  
To	  do	  this	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  separate	  those	  living	  in	  the	  area	  into	  four	  main	  groups.	  At	  
the	  centre	  of	  the	  group	  are	  the	  key	  ideologues,	  led	  by	  Al	  Baghdadi,	  along	  with	  four	  
councils:	  the	  Sharia,	  Shura,	  Military	  and	  Security.	  The	  structure	  employed	  at	  the	  core	  
is	   replicated	   across	   the	   various	   vilayats.	   Supporting	   this	   are	   the	   more	   zealous	  
followers	  of	   the	   ideology,	   individuals	  who	  occupy	  key	  governance	  positions.	   These	  
are	  predominantly	   individuals	  who	  were	  members	  of	  AQI	   and	   spent	   time	   in	  Camp	  
Bucca.89	  	  
The	  next	  ring	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  foreign	  fighters	  who	  travelled	  to	  
join	   ISIS	  and	   to	   fulfil	   a	   range	  of	  different	   roles.	  At	   the	  end	  of	  2015,	   there	  were	  an	  
estimated	  27,000	  foreign	  fighters	   in	   Iraq	  and	  Syria,	  from	  86	  states.90	  Of	  course,	  the	  
reasons	  for	  people	  travelling	  to	  join	  ISIS	  are	  multifarious,	  stemming	  from	  structural	  
violence	  and	  discrimination	   in	   the	  homeland	  and	  a	  crisis	  of	  modernity	   to	  concerns	  
for	   sectarian	   kin.91	  Conflict	   that	   engulfed	   the	   region	   took	  on	   an	   increasingly	   brutal	  
nature	  and	  as	  such,	  the	  violence	  conducted	  against	  sectarian	  kin	  would	  be	  a	  strong	  
motivating	   factor.	   Others	   struggled	   to	   situate	   themselves	   within	  Western	   political	  
contexts,	  where	  the	  struggle	  to	   find	  meaning	  and	  certainty	   in	  a	  crisis	  of	  modernity	  
made	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  ISIS	  message	  more	  appealing.92	  While	  there	  were	  a	  range	  
of	  groups	  for	  ‘foreign	  fighters’	  to	  join,	  the	  fundamentalist	  vision	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  ISIS	  
was	  appealing	  to	  most.	  	  
Of	   course,	   not	   all	   that	   joined	   the	   group	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   fighting,	   rather,	   a	  
number	  chose	   to	   travel	   to	  provide	  other	  kinds	  of	  support	   to	   the	  group.	  Behavioral	  
supporters	  can	  be	  broken	  down	   into	  active	  and	  passive	  supporters,	  emerging	  from	  
the	   extent	   of	   their	   involvement	   within	   the	   group’s	   activities.	   Obvious	   distinctions	  
must	  be	  drawn	  between	  those	  who	  travel	  to	  fight	  and	  those	  who	  travel	  to	  provide	  
medical	  assistance	  in	  ISIS-­‐ran	  hospitals.	  Passive	  supporters	  can	  be	  found	  across	  Iraq	  
and	  Syria,	  predominantly	  located	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  ISIS	  controlled	  territories	  yet	  
not	  openly	  sharing	   the	   ideological	  vision	  of	   the	  group.	  The	   last	  distinction	  must	  be	  
made	  with	   regard	   to	   those	   supporters	  who	  were	   induced	   to	   follow	   ISIS,	   between	  
individuals	  who	  were	  enticed,	  for	  gain	  or	  reward	  and	  those	  who	  were	  coerced	  to	  act	  
under	  duress.	  	  
Those	   living	  within	   ISIS	  controlled	  territory	  may	  differ	   in	  their	  vision	  and	   intentions	  
but	  they	  share	   in	  their	  experiences	  of	  governance	  and	  life	  under	   ISIS.	  The	  need	  for	  
ISIS	   to	   speak	   to	   this	   community,	  both	  active	  and	  passive,	   is	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  
state	   building	   project	   and	   the	   combination	   of	   asabiyya	   and	   securitization	   is	   a	  
prominent	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  building	  the	  state.	  Understanding	  this	  process	  helps	  
us	   to	  understand	  a	  range	  of	   factors	   typically	  missed	  by	  analysis	  of	   ISIS,	  particularly	  
these	   dynamics	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   how	   ISIS	   has	   engaged	   with	   local	   populations.	  
Moreover,	   by	   considering	   asabiyya	   and	   securitization	   strategies,	   we	   can	   better	  
shape	  responses	  to	  the	  group	  in	  the	  region	  along	  with	  counter	  narrative	  campaigns	  
in	  the	  West.	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The	  Owl	  of	  Minerva	  and	  the	  ‘Westphalian	  Straitjacket’	  
Underpinning	  much	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  terms	  of	  discussions	  of	  both	  
sovereignty	   and	   securitization	   are	   Western	   philosophical	   assumptions,	   which	   are	  
increasingly	  problematic.	  To	  better	  understand	  the	  emergence	  of	  ISIS	  it	  is	  imperative	  
to	  reflect	  not	  only	  on	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  has	  been	  used	  –	  and	  misused	  –	  but	  
also	  on	  a	  number	  of	  the	  concepts	  that	  are	  taken	  for	  granted	  with	  very	  little	  critical	  
engagement.	   As	   Hegel	   argues,	   the	   owl	   of	   Minerva	   stresses	   the	   need	   for	   such	  
reflection	  and	  we	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  remember	  that	  here.	  
With	  regard	  to	  empirical	   issues,	  desires	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	   ISIS	  have	  
led	   many	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   group,	   without	   paying	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	  
conditions	   that	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   it.	  While	   in	   depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   ideology	   and	  
structure	  of	  ISIS	  is	  essential,	  it	  is	  of	  equal	  importance	  to	  locate	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  
group	  within	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  Syrian	  and	  Iraqi	  political	  
contexts.	   Understanding	   the	   grievances	   faced	   by	   Sunni	   communities	   within	   both	  
states	  can	  help	  to	  identify	  why	  ISIS	  has	  been	  able	  to	  draw	  support	  from	  Sunni	  tribes	  
across	   the	   two	   states	   and	   internationally.	  Others	   have	   considered	   these	   structural	  
factors	   and	   the	   impact	   upon	   societal	   security	   but	   are	   yet	   to	   apply	   them	   to	   the	  
emergence	  of	   ISIS.93	  Additionally,	   such	  grounding	  also	   facilitates	  greater	  analysis	  of	  
why	  securitization	  narratives	  have	  proved	  so	  successful.	  	  
Discussion	   of	   conceptual	   issues	   requires	   much	   greater	   reflection.	   At	   the	   heart	   of	  
much	  of	  the	  writing	  on	  Middle	  Eastern	  International	  Relations	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  
state	   is	   the	  main	  unit	   of	   analysis,	   yet	   in	   recent	   years,	  with	   the	   fragmentation	  of	   a	  
number	   of	   states,	   this	   has	   become	   increasingly	   problematic. 94 	  Moreover,	   with	  
regimes	   facing	   pressures	   from	   sub	   and	   supra	   state	   identities,	   the	   notion	   that	   we	  
should	   view	   the	  Middle	   Eastern	   state	   as	   a	   homogenous	   ‘black	   box’	   is	   infelicitous.	  
Such	   Realist	   assumptions	   have	   also	   crept	   into	   other	   forms	   of	   analysis.	   For	   Claire	  
Wilkinson,	   the	   Westphalian	   understandings	   of	   sovereignty	   are	   driven	   by	   such	  
problems,	  and	  as	  such,	  “conveniently	  overlooked	  at	  best,	  and	  at	  worst	  reinterpreted	  
or	   ‘edited	   out’”	   95 	  the	   problems.	   Wilkinson	   also	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘Westphalian	  
straitjacket’	  means	  that	  “security	  dynamics	  are	  edited	  and	  Westernized	  through	  the	  
application	   of	   the	   theoretical	   framework”96	  and	   in	   doing	   so,	   ignores	   the	   nature	   of	  
political	   organisation	   in	   the	   non-­‐Western	   world,	   where	   identities	   and	   securitized	  
identities	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  transcend	  state	  borders.	  Given	  this,	  the	  securitization	  
process	  is	  rarely	  the	  simple,	  linear	  structure	  that	  many	  hold	  it	  to	  be.	  Furthermore,	  by	  
focussing	   on	   the	   state,	   the	   securitization	   project	   takes	   a	   serious	   risk	   by	   conflating	  
identity	   with	   state	   identity	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   essentialising	   identities.	   Moving	   the	  
securitization	  process	  away	   from	   the	   state	   is	  of	  paramount	   importance,	  while	  also	  
focussing	  on	  other	  identities	  and	  sources	  of	  legitimacy,	  which	  may	  play	  a	  prominent	  
role	  as	  facilitating	  conditions	  and	  in	  the	  state-­‐building	  process.	  	  	  
Conclusions	  
This	  article	  began	  by	  quoting	  a	  famous	  passage	  from	  Hegel,	  which	  stresses	  the	  need	  
for	  reflective	  analysis.	  Such	  a	  reflection	  is	   integral	  when	  engaging	  with	  ISIS,	  yet	  has	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largely	   been	   lacking.	   This	   article	   has	   reflected	   on	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   group	   by	  
considering	  the	  state-­‐building	  project	  and	  the	  application	  of	  concepts	  of	  sovereignty.	  
It	  has	  also	  provided	  scope	   to	  consider	  how	   ISIS	  has	  created	  a	  narrative	   that	  builds	  
support	  from	  Sunni	  Muslims	  both	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  internationally.	   	  Although	  
there	   are	   numerous	   problems	   with	   referring	   to	   ISIS	   as	   a	   state,	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	  
definition	  of	  domestic	  sovereignty,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  argue	  that	   it	  does	  not	  possess	  a	  
number	  of	  the	  conditions	  defined	  by	  Caporaso	  as	  comprising	  a	  state.	  Such	  a	  position	  
appears	   difficult	   to	   hold,	   given	   the	  morally	   repugnant	   actions	   of	   the	   group,	   yet	   in	  
accepting	  this	  conclusion,	   it	  can	  lead	  to	  different	  forms	  of	  engagement,	  or	  perhaps	  
lack	  thereof.	  
While	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   serious	   issues	   that	   arise	   when	   engaging	   with	   the	  
question	   of	   ISIS	   sovereignty,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   a	   number	   of	   these	   stem	   from	  
problematic	   notions	   of	   sovereignty.	   Indeed,	   by	   applying	  Western	   constructions	   of	  
sovereignty	  to	  ISIS	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  more	  broadly	  –	  addressed	  below	  –	  such	  an	  
application	   helps	   to	   tease	   out	   aspects	   of	   the	   group	   that	   have	   thus	   far	   remained	  
under	  explored.	  Moreover,	  in	  recognising	  the	  need	  to	  populate	  the	  new	  territory,	  it	  
is	  possible	   to	   identify	  aspects	  of	   the	   ISIS	  brand	   that	   seek	   to	  achieve	   this	  outcome.	  
Across	  the	  development	  of	  the	  state	  and,	  ultimately,	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  process	  
is	  the	  notion	  of	  consolidation.	  	  
Of	  course,	  if	  ISIS	  continues	  to	  lose	  territory	  across	  Iraq	  and	  Syria,	  then	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
caliphate	  may	  become	  moot	  and	  the	  number	  of	  people	  travelling	  to	  join	  the	  group	  
may	   diminish,	   yet	   root	   causes	   behind	   the	   emergence	   of	   Sunni	   extremism	   will	  
remain.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  by	  applying	  the	  concepts	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  securitization	  
to	   ISIS	  we	   are	   able	   to	   tease	   out	   important	   information	   about	   the	   group,	   yet	   at	   a	  
more	  theoretical	   level,	  such	  an	  application	  also	  reveals	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  with	  
the	   application	   of	   theory	   in	   the	   non-­‐Western	   world.	   It	   also	   gets	   caught	   in	   the	  
Westphalian	  straitjacked	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  projecting	  Western	  understandings	  of	  
sovereignty	  onto	   the	   region.	  Despite	   this,	  by	   rejecting	   the	  overly	   simplistic	  view	  of	  
ISIS	   as	   a	   terrorist	   organisation	   –	  much	   like	  Hizballah	   and	  Hamas	   -­‐	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
build	  a	  stronger	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  group.	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